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Abstract—Demand side management (DSM) is a key solution for reducing the peak-time power 
consumption in smart grids. To provide incentives for consumers to shift their consumption to off-peak 
times, the utility company charges consumers differential pricing for using power at different times of the 
day. Consumers take into account these differential prices when deciding when and how much power to 
consume daily. Importantly, while consumers enjoy lower billing costs when shifting their power usage to 
off-peak times, they also incur discomfort costs due to the altering of their power consumption patterns. 
Existing works propose stationary strategies for the myopic consumers to minimize their short-term 
billing and discomfort costs. In contrast, we model the interaction emerging among self-interested, 
foresighted consumers as a repeated energy scheduling game and prove that the stationary strategies are 
suboptimal in terms of long-term total billing and discomfort costs. Subsequently, we propose a novel 
framework for determining optimal nonstationary DSM strategies, in which consumers can choose 
different daily power consumption patterns depending on their preferences, routines, and needs. As a 
direct consequence of the nonstationary DSM policy, different subsets of consumers are allowed to use 
power in peak times at a low price. The subset of consumers that are selected daily to have their joint 
discomfort and billing costs minimized is determined based on the consumers’ power consumption 
preferences as well as on the past history of which consumers have shifted their usage previously. 
Importantly, we show that the proposed strategies are incentive-compatible. Simulations confirm that, 
given the same peak-to-average ratio, the proposed strategy can reduce the total cost (billing and 
discomfort costs) by up to 50% compared to existing DSM strategies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Smart grids aim to provide a more reliable, environmentally friendly and economically 
efficient power system [1][2]. The utility company sells electricity to consumers, who are 
equipped with smart meters. Smart meters exchange information between consumers and the 
utility company, and schedule the household energy consumption for consumers. The information 
gathered through smart meters can be used by the utility company to adjust the electricity prices.  
Demand Side Management (DSM) is a key mechanism to make smart grids more efficient and 
cost-effective [1][2]. DSM refers to the programs adopted by utility companies to directly or 
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indirectly influence the consumers’ power consumption behavior in order to reduce the Peak-to-
Average Ratio (PAR) of the total load in the smart grid system. A higher PAR results in much 
higher operation costs and possibly outages of the system. DSM aims to incentivize consumers to 
shift their peak-time power consumption to off-peak times, thereby resulting in significant PAR 
reductions in the power system. 
A. Related Work 
Direct Load Control (DLC) and Smart Pricing (SP) are two popular existing approaches for 
implementing DSM. DLC refers to the program in which the utility company can remotely 
manage a fraction of consumers’ appliances to shift their peak-time power usage to off-peak times 
[3]. Alternatively, SP [6]-[18] provides an economic incentive for consumers to voluntarily 
manage their power usage. Examples are Real-Time Pricing (RTP) [6], Time-Of-Use Pricing 
(TOU) [14], Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) [16]-[18], etc. However, the above works [3][6]-[8][16]-
[18] do not consider the consumers’ discomfort costs which is induced by altering their power 
consumption patterns. 
Some recent works considered consumers’ discomfort costs [4][5][9]-[15][20][23] and aimed 
to jointly minimize the consumers’ billing and discomfort costs (referred to subsequently as the 
total cost). These works can be classified into two categories, depending on the deployed 
consumer model. The first category assumed that the consumers are price-taking (i.e., they do not 
consider how their consumption will affect the prices). By assuming that consumers are price-
takers,  the decision making of a single foresighted consumer is formulated as a stochastic control 
problem aiming to minimize its long-term total cost in [9]-[11]. Alternatively, in [12][13], 
multiple myopic consumers aim to minimize their current total costs and their decisions are 
formulated as static optimization problems among cooperative users for which distributed 
algorithms are proposed to find the optimal prices.  
The second category assumed that the consumers are myopic and price-anticipating (i.e., they 
take into account how their consumption will affect the prices). In this case, each consumer’s 
power usage affects the other consumers’ billing costs. These works [6]-[8][15] modeled the 
interactions emerging among myopic consumers as one-shot games and studied the Nash 
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TABLE I. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING WORKS 
 DLC or SP 
Price-taking 
or price-anticipating 
consumers 
Myopic or 
foresighted 
consumers 
Single consumer or 
multiple consumers Model 
Consumer 
Discomfort 
[3] DLC - Myopic Multiple Optimization No 
[4][5] DLC - Myopic Multiple Optimization Yes 
[6]-[8] SP Price-anticipating Myopic Multiple One-shot game No 
[9]-[11] SP Price-taking Foresighted Single Stochastic control Yes 
[12][13]  SP Price-taking Myopic Multiple Optimization Yes 
[14] SP Price-taking Myopic Single One-shot game Yes 
[15] SP Price-anticipating Myopic Multiple One-shot game Yes 
[16] SP Price-taking Myopic Multiple Optimization No 
Our Work SP Price-anticipating Foresighted Multiple Repeated game Yes 
 
equilibrium (NE) of the emerging game. In this paper, we also model the consumers as price-
anticipating. However, in our model, the consumers interact with each other repeatedly and are 
foresighted, thereby engaging in a repeated game. 
It is well-known that in one-shot games with myopic price-anticipating consumers, the system 
performance (i.e., the total cost) at the equilibrium can be much worse than the optimal 
performance achieved by myopic price-taking consumers [25]. One way to achieve the same 
performance for myopic price-anticipating consumers as in the case of myopic price-taking 
consumers is to model the system as a repeated game, and to incentivize the price-anticipating 
consumers to choose (in equilibrium) the optimal consumption adopted by myopic price-taking 
consumers [24]. Importantly, in this paper we go one step further, and adopt a novel repeated 
game framework which can significantly outperform the optimal performance obtained by the 
myopic price-taking consumers [12][13].  
All the existing works considering multiple consumers [3]-[8][12]-[16] assumed that the 
consumers are myopic and minimize their current costs. The optimal DSM strategies in these 
works are stationary, i.e., all consumers adopt fixed daily/weekly power consumption patterns as 
long as the system parameters (e.g., the consumers’ desired power consumption patterns) do not 
change. However, as we will show later in the paper, the stationary DSM strategies are 
suboptimal in terms of the long-term total cost. To minimize the total cost, some consumers are 
required to shift their peak-time power usage to the off-peak times while the remaining consumers 
can use energy when desired. By deploying this optimal strategy, the consumers who shift their 
peak-time consumption incur discomfort costs, but this leads to a reduction of the peak-time price 
and of the billing cost of all the consumers. Importantly, our proposed nonstationary DSM 
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strategy can achieve the optimal total cost while ensuring fairness among consumers by 
recommending different subsets of consumers (referred to as the active set) to shift their peak-
time consumption each day. The active set is determined by the consumers’ preferences and the 
past selection of active sets. 
A detailed comparison of our work and existing works is highlighted in Table I. 
B. Our Contributions 
In this paper, since the consumers stay in the system for a long time and interact with each 
other repeatedly, we formulate the consumers’ interactions as a repeated game. The repeated 
nature of the interaction provides incentives for price-anticipating consumers to cooperate (as 
shown in [24]). Although the proposed framework can improve the performance of the stationary 
DSM strategies discussed for any SP scheme, we focus on the CPP scheme, which has been 
widely used for residential consumers and is shown to work well in practical scenarios [17]-[19]. 
CPP defines peak days in a year or peak times in a day, and charges higher prices during these 
peak hours if CPP events, such as system load warning, extreme weather conditions, and system 
emergencies, occur [18]. 
Based on the repeated game model, we propose an optimal nonstationary1 DSM mechanism 
that minimizes the total cost and outperforms the optimal stationary DSM strategy. In addition, 
the proposed strategy is Incentive-Compatible (IC), namely the self-interested consumers will find 
it in their self-interest to follow the recommended strategy. Each day, the DSM strategy selects an 
active set of consumers based on their preferences of whether or when to shift and on the past 
history of consumption pattern shifts. These consumers sacrifice their current discomfort costs to 
minimize the total billing cost. In return, they will enjoy in the future lower billing costs without 
incurring discomfort costs when other consumers are chosen in the active set. In this way, the 
proposed strategy minimizes the long-term total cost while ensuring fairness among the 
consumers.  
In summary, the main contributions of our work are as follows: 
                                                          
1 Recall that in a stationary DSM mechanism, the consumers adopt fixed daily/weekly power consumption patterns as long as the 
system parameters do not change. In contrast, in a nonstationary DSM mechanism, the consumers may adopt different 
daily/weekly power consumption patterns (e.g., a consumer may shift its peak-time consumption today but not shift tomorrow) 
even if the system parameters remain the same. 
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 A Repeated Game Framework: A repeated game framework is proposed to model the 
interactions among foresighted price-anticipating consumers over time. 
 Joint Billing and Discomfort Costs Minimization: The proposed DSM mechanism considers 
not only the consumers’ billing costs but also their discomfort costs. 
 Optimal Nonstationary DSM mechanism: We analytically prove that in the energy 
scheduling game with discomfort costs, nonstationary DSM mechanisms can outperform 
stationary mechanisms, and propose an optimal nonstationary DSM mechanism that can be easily 
implemented.  
 IC strategies: The DSM mechanism is IC, meaning that the self-interested consumers have 
no incentive to deviate from the recommended strategy. 
 Consumer heterogeneity: Our framework can model different types of consumers with 
different discomfort costs. Moreover, different consumers may have different preferences on how 
and when their consumption patterns are shifted. We study the impact of different types of 
consumers on the performance of the proposed mechanism. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II models the repeated energy scheduling 
game and formulates the DSM mechanism design problem. Section III formally introduces the 
proposed algorithm for constructing the DSM strategy and discusses how to implement the 
proposed algorithm in the smart grid system. Section IV provides simulation results to validate the 
performance of the proposed algorithm. Section V concludes the paper. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
A. Energy Scheduling Game 
A smart grid system consists of a utility company and multiple consumers, as shown in Fig.1. 
The DSM is implemented through smart meters on the consumer side and a DSM center in the 
utility company [2].  
We denote the set of consumers by N{1,2,..., }N . Time is divided into periods 
t 0,1,2, L . We assume that each period is divided into H  N  time slots with equal length 
and denote the set of time slots by H{1,2,..., }H . Note that we use “period” here to denote 
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Fig. 1. Smart Grid System Model. 
each stage of the interaction among consumers and use “time slot” to denote the discrete time to 
schedule power usage within a period. In this paper, we consider a period to be one day as in [6]-
[9][12]-[16], and each slot can be one or multiple hours (e.g., H 24 , H 12 ).  
For each consumer i  N in period t , its action is the power consumption pattern in that 
period, which is the vector of power consumption at each time slot and denoted by 
t t t
i i i H
a a a
,1 ,
( , , ) , with t
i ih
a
,
 A  being the power consumption and 
i
A  being the set of power 
consumption at each time slot.  
The power consumption t
i h
a
,
 at time slot h  consists of non-shiftable load and shiftable load. 
The non-shiftable load, such as lighting, cooking, watching TV, is not controllable by smart 
meters, while the shiftable load, such as dish and clothes washing, heating and cooling systems, 
can be controlled by the smart meters [6]-[8]. We denote the non-shiftable and shiftable loads at 
time slot h  H  by t
i h
b
,
0  and t
i h
s
,
0 , respectively. Thus, consumer i ’s power consumption 
satisfies t
i h h h
t
i i
tba s
, , ,
  and t t
i h i h
a b
, ,
 . Note that here the shiftable load is not only limited to the 
deferrable load, but also includes “smart thermostats” aimed at controlling heating/cooling 
systems, which can shift the energy usage ahead of time and have been shown [19] to 
significantly reduce the peak load in practice, etc.  
We denote by H t
i h ih
a A
,1
  the daily total power consumption for residential consumer i , 
where 
i
A  is either a constant or slowly varying as in [6]-[8][13]-[16]. We denote by 
t t t t
N
a a a
1 2
( , , ) La A  the power consumption profile of all consumers, where 
i
H
i
N
1A A . 
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The total load at time slot h , denoted by Nt t
h i hi
l a
,1
 , is the sum of all consumers’ power 
consumption.  
We assume that the desired power consumption pattern in each period for consumer i  is 
i i H ii i
Ha a a a
,1 ,2 ,
[ , , ] L A , which refers to its preferred daily power consumption pattern [22]. 
The corresponding desired power consumption profile of all consumers and total load are denoted 
by 
N
a a a
1 2
[ , , ] La A  and N
h i hi
l a
,1
 . Define h
h
h largmax


H
 as the peak time of the 
day, the length of which changes according to how H  is set. Empirical studies show that, 
compared with industrial and commercial consumers, residential consumers have very similar 
peak-time shiftable loads [19], implying that t
i h i h h
a b s
, ,
  , for each consumer i . 
Remark: First, different consumers may have different desired power consumption patterns 
i
a . 
For example, most consumers may have their highest power consumption in the evening, while 
some consumers may have highest power consumption in the morning. Second, each consumer 
can have its individual peak consumption in hours other than h ; h  is determined based on the 
aggregate power consumption of all consumers, instead of the power consumption of individual 
consumers. Third, in the model currently presented, we let the desired daily power consumption 
pattern 
i
a  to be the same for each day. One may argue that the desired daily power consumption 
should be different in weekdays and in weekends. In this case, we can easily extend the model 
such that one period is one week and 
i
a  is the desired weekly power consumption pattern, where 
the desired daily power consumption patterns are different each day. 
The cost of a consumer consists of billing and discomfort costs. The billing cost is the power 
consumed multiplied by the unit price and the discomfort cost is the consumer’s discomfort 
caused by rescheduling its daily power consumption from its desired power consumption pattern. 
We denote 
i
c : a RA  to be the cost function of consumeri : 
 
Ht t t t
i h i h i ih
c p a d a
,1
( ) ( ) ( )

 a a , (1) 
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where 
h
p : a RA  denotes the price at time slot h ,
H t t
h i hh
p a
,1
( )
 a  denotes the daily billing 
cost, H
i i
d : a RA  denotes the discomfort cost of consumer i . Without loss of generality, the 
total cost is the sum, instead of the weighted sum, of billing and discomfort costs, because any 
weight the consumer puts on the discomfort cost can be absorbed in the expression of the 
discomfort cost function 
i
d . We will discuss later the price 
h
p  and discomfort cost 
i
d  in detail. 
To model the interactions among consumers, we first formalize the one-shot energy scheduling 
game N
i i ii
NG c
1 1
{ , } ,{ }{ }  N A , where N , 
N
ii 1
{ } A  and 
N
i i
c
1
{ }     denote the set of consumers, 
sets of actions and cost functions for each consumer, respectively. 
Next, we formalize the repeated game model. In each period t , consumer i  determines its 
power consumption pattern t
i
a  based on its history, which is a collection of all its past power 
consumption patterns and the past prices made public to the consumers. The history of consumer 
i  up to period t  can be written as: t t t
i i i
t
ii
H Ha p a p a p0 0 1 1 1 1{ , , , ,..., , } )(     A P  for t 0  and 
the initial history is defined as 
i
0   . The corresponding public history is defined as 
t t H tp p p0 1 1{ , ,..., } ( )   P  for t 0  and the initial history is defined as 0   . The public 
strategy of consumer i  is defined as a mapping from public history to current action, denoted by 
H t
i i
t 0
(: )


U aP A , where H 0( )  P [24]. Due to realization equivalence principle [24, Lemma 
7.1.2], we lose nothing, in terms of the achievable operating points, by restricting to public 
strategies, compared to strategies using the entire history. 
Given the strategy profile of all consumers, denoted by 
N1 2
( , , )   L , consumer i ’s 
average long-term cost is discounted by a factor  : 
 t t
i it
C c
0
( ) (1 ) ( ( ))  


    , (2) 
where t
i
c ( ( ))  is the cost of consumer i  in period t . The discount factor [0,1)   represents 
how consumers discount their monetary costs in the future, e.g. due to interest rates/inflation. A 
smaller   means that the consumers discount their future costs more. Since the interest 
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rate/inflation is usually the same for all the consumers, we assume   to be equal for all consumers 
as in [24][25]. The corresponding long-term discounted discomfort cost is denoted by 
i
D ( ) . 
Hence, the infinitely repeated game model can be written as 
H t
i
N N
i i
t
i
RG C
0
1 1
{ , ( } ( )} }) ,{ ,{

 
 UN P  , where N , H t
t 0
( )


U P , N
ii 1
{ }   and 
N
i i
C
1
( )}{   denote 
the set of consumers, set of public histories, sets of strategies and sets of cost functions, 
respectively. 
B. Critical Peak Pricing Scheme 
Recall that in Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) scheme, the utility company charges a higher price 
in the critical peak time when CPP events occur (such as system load warning, extreme weather 
conditions, and system emergencies), aiming at reducing the peak-time load of the system [16]-
[18]. The maximum number of critical days and of critical hours within a day is predefined.  
We model the CPP pricing scheme with a single critical peak time and only consider the CPP 
events triggered by the total load in the system. The time-varying price function t
h
p ( )a  is defined 
as: 
 
t
Lo h tht t
th h h
Hi h th
p l l
p p l
p l l
    
   
,
 
0
( ) ( )
,
     
a , (3) 
where
Hi Lo
p p are the peak price and off-peak price of the pricing model and 
th
l  is the threshold 
of the total load. When t
h th
l l , the higher price will not be triggered and 
Lo
p  will be adopted. 
When t
h th
l l , the CPP event occurs and the higher price 
Hi
p  will be adopted. To provide 
incentives for consumers to shift their peak-time loads, the threshold 
th
l  is set to be below the 
peak load and above the off-peak load, namely, 
 
h th h th
l l l l h h    , \ }  , {    H . (4) 
Given peak load reduction goal, namely 
th
l , we further set  h th hl lm s/ , where m  ¥  
is the smallest number of consumers needed to shift their peak-time consumption such that the 
peak-time price is low. We denote the prices within a day by 
H
p p p
1 2
( , , ) Lp . 
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C. Consumer Discomfort Cost 
We use a discomfort cost function to model the consumers’ discomfort from rescheduling their 
power consumption patterns. Many papers define the discomfort cost function based on the 
imposed change in their consumption patterns, i.e., the “distance” between consumer’s desired 
demand and actual consumption [14][20]-[23]. As in [14][20], we use a linear weighted function 
to model the discomfort cost: 
 
H t t
t i h i h i h i i ih
i i t
i i
k a a a a
d a
a a
, , ,1
(| |) ,  
( )
0,                                   


     
 , (5) 
where 
i h i
k
,
,

 R  are parameters of  the discomfort cost function. Consumer i ’s discomfort 
cost 
i i
d a( )  is an increasing function of the ‘distance’ between the rescheduled and the desired 
power consumption patterns. 
The above discomfort cost function is able to capture several important consumer preferences 
in terms of consumption pattern shifting. First, 
i
 captures the consumer’s willingness to shift: a 
consumer with a large 
i
 is less willing to shift. Second, 
i h
k
,
captures the consumer’s preference 
on how to shift. A larger 
hi
k
,
indicates that the consumer does not want to reduce its peak-time 
consumption; a larger 
i h
k
,
 for h h indicates that the consumer does not want to shift its peak-
time consumption to time slot h. 
We are interested in two costs that consumer i  can achieve: consumer i ’s minimum cost 
achievable by any power consumption profile, denoted by =min ( )=
i i Lo i
c c p A
Aa
a , and consumer 
i ’s minimum cost achievable by any power consumption profile in which consumer i  shifts all 
its peak-time shiftable load, denoted by 
, ,
min ( ) ( )
i h i h
i i Lo i i ia b
c c p A d a
 
  % %
Aa , 
a , where 
H
i i hi i h
i i i
a a b
a d a
, ,
argmin ( )
 
%
, A
. Clearly, we always have 
i i
c c % , because 
i
c%  is the minimum cost 
achievable when constrained to consumer i ’s certain power consumption patterns (which cause 
discomfort costs). The cost 
i
c  is important because it is the minimum cost that consumer i  could 
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possibly achieve. The cost 
i
c% is also important because it represents the minimum cost that 
consumer i  could possibly achieve when it shifts all of its peak-time consumption (i.e. when it is 
selected to be in the active set).  
Based on the relationship between billing and discomfort costs, we can classify the consumers 
into three classes. 
 Consumers with low discomfort costs: This class includes consumers whose discomfort 
costs are low compared with 
Hi Lo
p p . In this case, the increase in the price matters much more 
to consumers than the discomfort costs. For these consumers, the discomfort costs can be 
reasonably ignored and only the billing costs need to be considered. 
 Consumers with medium discomfort costs: This class includes consumers who have 
medium discomfort costs with respect to 
Hi Lo
p p . In this case, both billing and discomfort costs 
need to be considered. We say a consumer has medium discomfort cost if 
 
,
( )
( )  [( )]Hi Lo h
i i i Hi Lo i h
p p l
d a and p p a
m


  % . (6) 
The first inequality implies that the discomfort cost is not too large, such that the consumers 
are willing to shift their peak-time consumption if by doing so their billing costs can be greatly 
reduced. The second inequality implies that the discomfort cost is not too small, such that each 
consumer does care about its own discomfort cost and is not willing to shift its peak-time 
consumption every day. 
 Consumers with high discomfort costs: This class includes consumers who have high 
discomfort costs parameters compared with 
Hi Lo
p p . In this case, discomfort costs are high 
when altering their power consumption patterns and hence they should be recommended not to 
change their power consumption patterns. 
In a practical system, the above three classes of consumers coexist. However, since the 
recommendations to consumers with low and high discomfort costs can be determined based on 
their cost characteristics (namely, consumers with low discomfort costs always shift and choose 
i
a% , while consumers with high discomfort costs cannot shift their power consumption pattern and 
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choose 
i
a ), we only need to consider the DSM strategy for consumers with medium discomfort 
costs. Hence, in Section III, we focus on deriving the optimal DSM strategy for consumers with 
medium discomfort costs. The optimal DSM strategy derived for consumers with medium 
discomfort costs, along with the predetermined recommended strategies for consumers with high 
and low discomfort costs, constitutes the DSM strategy used in the practical system with three 
classes of consumers. 
D. Problem Formulation 
In this subsection, we consider the system with self-interested consumers and formulate the 
optimal IC DSM mechanism design problem. 
The designer is the benevolent utility company that aims at minimizing the total cost 
(maximizing the social welfare) in the smart grid system. However, except for the total cost, 
maintaining fairness among all the consumers is essential [19]. Hence, the mechanism will ensure 
that the average discomfort cost of consumer i  is no greater than a maximal value 
i
D
,max
. 
Therefore, the DSM mechanism Design Problem (DDP) can be formulated as 
 
π i
t t
i h i h
H t
i i hh
i
i
i
C
a b t
A a t
D i
is
D
IC
, ,
,1
,max
(DDP): minimize    ( )
,
( ) ,
         subject to   ,


 
 






 N
T
                        T
                        N
                          



.  
The utility company will solve this problem, then recommend the consumers with the optimal 
solution * . 
The abovementioned energy scheduling game model can be extended or revised in different 
ways to accommodate various systems. First, the CPP scheme may be only applied in the summer 
and winter seasons, when the system load is high. In this case, the DSM mechanism can update 
the system parameters and begin to solve the DDP problem again, at the beginning of a new 
season. Second, the daily power consumption 
i
A  for a specific consumer i  can vary for different 
days during a week, due to their different weekly routines, e.g. they do the laundry on Fridays etc. 
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In this case, we can set the period in the model to be a week, instead of a day, and set the daily 
total power consumption and desired power consumption pattern as mod7
,1
H t t
i h ih
a A

  and 
mod7t t
i i
a a , where 6
0
{ }
i
A   and 
6
0
{ }
i
a    are the daily power consumption and desired power 
consumption patterns of a week and are different for different days of a week.   
III. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 
In this section, we solve the DDP problem defined in the previous section. We first discuss a 
benchmark case - the performance of the one-shot energy scheduling game. Subsequently, we 
characterize the Pareto efficient operating points of the repeated energy scheduling game and 
propose our nonstationary algorithm that achieves the optimal solution of the DDP problem. 
Finally, we describe the implementation of the proposed DSM in the smart grid system. 
A. Benchmark – The One-shot Energy Scheduling Game 
In the unique NE of the one-shot energy scheduling game, the consumer chooses its desired 
power consumption pattern. We state this formally in the following theorem. 
Theorem 1 (Nash Equilibrium of the One-shot Game): The one-shot energy scheduling game 
has a unique NE, in which each consumer chooses its desired power usage as 
 
i i
a a i* ,   N . (7) 
Proof: The idea of the proof is to show that 
i
a is the dominant strategy for consumer i . The 
complete proof is given in Appendix A.□ 
The result of Theorem 1 is the well-known “tragedy of commons”. Each consumer aims to 
minimize its individual billing and discomfort costs and thus, it will myopically find in its self-
interest to minimize its individual cost by sticking to its desired power consumption pattern. This 
results in a high price and low social welfare. According to Theorem 1, the total cost at the unique 
NE is N
i NEi
C
,1 , where i NE iC c, ( ) a . In the following section we will quantify the inefficiency 
of the NE and propose a novel DSM mechanism that can achieve the optimal social welfare. 
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B. Pareto-optimal Region of the Repeated Energy Scheduling Game 
 We formally characterize the achievable operating points of the repeated energy scheduling 
game. It is well known that as long as   is sufficiently close to 1, the achievable region of the 
repeated energy scheduling game is the convex hull of the one-shot energy scheduling game [24, 
Lemma 3.7.1]. Hence, we can write the achievable region of repeated energy scheduling game as 
, , ,1
{ | ,( , })
H
i h i i h i hh
a Acon av b

   C Ac a a , where { }conv X   is the convex hull of X  and 
1 2
( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))
N
c c c Lc a a a a  is the cost profile of the consumers. We will prove that the Pareto-
optimal region of the repeated energy scheduling game (i.e., the Pareto boundary of the set of 
achievable cost profiles), denoted by B , is a face of C  that is a polytope with dimension N 1 . 
This means that we can analytically express the Pareto-optimal region. Theorem 2 formally 
characterizes the Pareto-optimal region B  analytically. 
Theorem 2: The Pareto-optimal region of the repeated energy scheduling game is 
 
1 2 1
( , , , ) | ( ) / ( ) ,{ }
N
N i i i i i ii
C C C C c c c m C c

      % % %LB C .  (8) 
In addition, the stationary DSM strategies can only achieve the extreme points2 of B . 
Proof: See Appendix B. □ 
Theorem 2 does not only characterize the Pareto-optimal region (i.e., part of a hyperplane) of 
the repeated energy scheduling game, but also proves that by using stationary DSM strategies, we 
cannot achieve any points on the Pareto-optimal region other than the extreme points. Note, 
however, that, the extreme points can only be achieved by the action profiles in which m  
consumers shift their peak consumption and incur cost 
i
c , while the other consumers do not shift 
and incur cost 
i
c% . It is clear that the extreme points are not desirable operating points, because an 
extreme point can be achieved only when a fixed set of m  consumers shift their peak-time 
consumption all the time, which is unfair for these m consumers because they incur high 
discomfort costs all the time. Hence, the desired operating points lie in the interior of the Pareto-
optimal region, which can be achieved by nonstationary strategies in the repeated energy 
scheduling game according to Theorem 2. 
                                                          
2 An extreme point of a convex set is the point that is not the convex combination of any other points in this set. In our case, since 
B  is part of a hyperplane, the extreme points will be the vertices of B . 
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By adding IC constraints and the constraints on the maximum discomfort costs, the feasible 
Pareto-optimal region can be written as 
 
1 2 1
( , , , ) | ( ) / ( ){ }, ,
N
N i i i i i i i ii
C C C C c c c m C c C C

       % % %LBC C , (9) 
where 
i i i NE
C C C
,max ,
min{ , } , 
i i i
C c D
,max ,max
 % . 
C. Nonstationary DSM Mechanism 
Given the Pareto-optimal region, we can then reformulate the DDP problem as a linear 
programming problem: 
 i i
C
subje
minimize
ct to    
   


CC
N
B
.  (10) 
The solution of (10) is an extreme point of CB , denoted by NC C C
* * * *
1 2
( ), , LC . 
Theorem 3: The feasible Pareto-optimal region CB  is achievable if the discount factor   
satisfies 
 
N m
1
1
1
  
 
.  (11) 
Proof: See Appendix C. □ 
Given a desired operating point in CB , we can use the Nonstationary DSM (N-DSM) algorithm, 
described in Table II, to construct the DSM strategy. In period t , the N-DSM algorithm chooses 
the active set I t( )  I  consisting of m  out of N  consumers to reschedule their power 
consumption patterns, where I  is the set of all possible index combination that containing m  
consumers out of N . The choice of which m  consumers are selected depends on “how far” they 
are from their target cost and this is measured by index 
i
g t( )  and the m  consumers who have the 
largest 
i
g t( )  will alter their power consumption patterns. 
Theorem 4: When the discount factor   satisfies (11), the N-DSM algorithm is IC and can 
achieve the optimal operating point 
N
C C C* * * *
1 2
( ), , LC . 
Proof: See Appendix D. □ 
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Theorem 3 and 4 state that when the discount factor satisfies (11), the optimal nonstationary 
DSM mechanism can be constructed by the N-DSM algorithm. In practice, the daily interest rate 
is low enough to make condition (11) be satisfied and the proposed DSM mechanism can 
accommodate a large number of consumers. 
D. DSM Implementation 
In this subsection, we describe how to implement the DSM mechanism in the smart grid 
system based on the proposed N-DSM algorithm. The public information, such as price 
information and total load, is known to every consumer and the private information of consumer 
i , such as discomfort cost, power consumption, is only known to its own. There are two phases in 
implementing the DSM mechanism: the initialization phase and the run time phase. As in [2], the 
utility company recommends the strategy one day in advance.3 Consumers can schedule their 
power usage and exchange information with utility company through smart meters for the 
upcoming day so as to minimize their billing and discomfort costs based on the recommendation. 
                                                          
3 The DSM can also be implemented in real-time or T-day-ahead, as long as there is enough time for the consumers to respond to 
the recommendations. 
TABLE II. NONSTATIONARY DSM (N-DSM) ALGORITHM 
Input: Target average cost vector * * * *, ,( )1 2 NC C C LC , 0t  . 
Output: Optimal strategy 
1: Set *( ) ( ) ( )j j j j jg t C c c c  % % . 
2: Repeat 
3:        If ( ) ,Hihp p t    , then 
4:                Recommend action ia  to all consumer i . 
5:        Else 
6:                Find the active set ( ) { , , }1 2 mI t i i i L  of m  consumers who have the m  largest indices ( )jg t . 
7:                Recommend action ia%  to ( )i I t , and ia  to ( )i I t . 
8:                Observe consumers’ action ia . 
9:                If all consumers follow the recommendation, then  
10:                           Update { ( )}( ) [ ( ) ( ) ] /1 1i i i I tg t g t      1  for all i . 
11:                           Broadcast ( )h Lop t p  for all h . 
12:                Else 
13:                           Broadcast ( ) Hihp t p  and ( ) ,h Lop t p h h  . 
14:                End if          
15:       End if 
16:      1t t   
17: End Repeat 
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The details of public and private information, the two phases and the corresponding information 
exchange of the two phases are shown in Fig. 2 and Table III. 
Initialization:① The utility company broadcasts the CPP parameters: 
Lo
p , 
Hi
p  and 
th
l . ②  
Consumer i  calculates its cost parameters 
i
c%  and 
i
c , and sends them to the utility company. ③  
The utility company calculates the target cost vector 
N
C C C* * * *
1 2
( ), , LC  by solving DDP 
problem, and then sends the target cost vector to all consumers.  
Run time: In each period: ④ The DSM center calculates the active set I t( )  and then makes the 
recommendation 
i
t( )  to each consumer. ⑤  Each consumer chooses its energy scheduling 
strategy. Note that the consumers can deviate from the recommended strategy. However, since the 
strategy is IC, it is in their self-interest to comply with the recommendation.⑥  The smart meter 
reports the power consumption patterns t
i
a  to DSM center. ⑦  The utility company calculates the 
price based on the total load and then broadcasts the prices. Go to next period and repeat -④ ⑦ . 
The consumers’ discomfort cost functions may vary over time. For example, they may have 
different desired power consumption patterns in different seasons/months, or they may prefer to 
shift the peak-time consumption to different off-peak times (i.e., different 
i h
k
,
) due to their change 
of schedules (e.g., due to a new job), or they simply change their willingness (i.e., different 
i
 ) to 
shift. To accommodate for such occasional changes (e.g., once a month), the utility company can 
 
Fig.2. The Implementation of DSM. 
TABLE III. INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Public information  
(known to all consumers) 
, , , ( ), tHi Lo th hp p p l m l  
Consumer i ’s private 
information ( ),
t t
i i id a a  
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 Utility company 
to consumer i 
Initialization *, , , ,Hi Lo th hp p l l①: C  
Run time ,i p④: ⑦:  
Consumer i to 
utility company 
Initialization ( )( , ), i i i i id a or c c a% %②:  
Run time tia⑤⑥:  
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TABLE V. COMPARISONS OF DIFFERENT MECHANISMS 
Works Algorithm Strategies 
[6]-[8] 
[15]  OG-DSM ,min{ ( ) ( )}1i
H
h i h i iha
p a d a

 a  
[12][13]  JO-DSM ,min [ ( ) ( )]1 1
N H
h i h i in h
p a d a
 
 
a
a  
[9]-[11] SC-DSM ,min{ ( ) ( )}1 1
i
H
h i h i iha
p a d a

   
Our 
work N-DSM 
min{( ) ( ( ))}
0
1
i
t t t
it
c  


    
 
run the initialization phase again in order to calculate the new optimal target cost vector, and then 
run the N-DSM algorithm based on the updated target cost vector. 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
In this section, we compare the performance of our proposed DSM mechanism with those 
obtained using the one-shot energy scheduling games with myopic price-anticipating consumers 
[6]-[8][15], joint optimization with myopic price-taking consumers [12][13], as well as stochastic 
control methods with a single foresighted consumer [9]-[11]. Then we study the impact of 
different consumer preferences. In addition, we study the system performance when the 
percentage of shiftable load and the length of the peak time vary. 
Throughout this section, we use the following system parameters by default unless we change 
some of them explicitly. We consider the scenario that H 24  time slots and set the discount 
factor of the consumers to be 0.995  , which ensures that (11) is satisfied. The pricing scheme 
sets the peak price and off-peak price to be 
Hi
p 0.8 $/kWh and 
Lo
p 0.1  $/kWh4. According 
to the utility company’s PAR goal (namely the percentage of reduction in peak-time load, written 
as  h th hl l l/ ), the threshold thl  in (3) will be set to an appropriate value to control the 
parameter m . We simulate both the scenario with heterogeneous consumers with parameters 
shown in Table IV and Fig. 3 and the scenario with homogeneous consumers with the same 
parameters as Type 1 consumers described in Table IV and Fig. 3. In this experiment, the 
shiftable load of each consumer is set to be 40% of the consumer’s total load.  
A. Comparison with Existing Mechanisms 
In this subsection we compare our proposed N-DSM algorithm with the existing ones [6][7]. 
                                                          
4 According to [17][19], the peak price is often at least 6 times higher than the off-peak price. 
 
 
TABLE IV. PARAMETERS OF THREE TYPES OF CONSUMERS 
 iA (kWh) , ( )1  14i hk h to / 
, ( )15  24i hk h to ($/kWh) 
i ($) ,maxiD ($)
Type 1 10 0.2/0.1 0.7 0.71 
Type 2 8 0.1/0.05 1.5 0.91 
Type 3 11 0.15/0.1 1.2 0.95 
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TABLE VI. COMPARISON OF TOTAL COSTS ACHIEVED BY DIFFERENT ALGORITHMS 
 Number of consumers (Homogeneous, PAR<2.280) Number of consumers (Heterogeneous, PAR<2.359 ) 
 30 50 80 100 200 30 50 80 100 200
Total cost 
OG-DSM 49.95 83.25 133.20 166.50 333.00 50.95 84.95 135.90 169.80 339.70
JO-DSM 42.18 70.08 111.95 139.86 279.40 42.37 70.41 112.46 140.48 280.66
SC-DSM 46.63 77.71 124.34 155.42 310.84 47.73 79.59 127.32 159.07 318.26
N-DSM 30.78 50.78 80.78 100.78 200.78 26.23 43.25 68.35 84.50 168.73
Performance 
gain 
Over OG-DSM 38% 39% 39% 39% 40% 49% 49% 50% 50% 50%
Over JO-DSM 27% 28% 28% 28% 28% 38% 39% 39% 40% 40%
Over SC-DSM 34% 35% 35% 35% 35% 45% 46% 46% 47% 47%
 
We divide the existing algorithms into three categories as shown in Table V.  
The One-shot Game based stationary DSM (OG-DSM) algorithms with myopic price-
anticipating consumers [6]-[8][15] calculate the NE and operate at NE of the one-shot energy 
scheduling game, which is characterized in Theorem 1. The Joint Optimization (JO-DSM) 
algorithms with myopic price-taking consumers [12][13] assume that the obedient consumers 
jointly minimize the total cost of the system. In this case, the optimal performance of stationary 
DSM mechanism can be achieved by appropriate pricing schemes. The Single-consumer 
Stochastic Control (SC-DSM) methods [9]-[11] try to use stochastic control methods to minimize 
the total cost of a single consumer. In this case, the utility company sets the price as 
h Hi
p p and 
h Lo
p p h h,  , and the consumer buys energy in advance according to its scheduled power 
consumption pattern 
i
a . We assume that renewable energy is available with probability5 0.8  , 
in which case the consumer can reschedule its power consumption pattern to the desired pattern 
without suffering the discomfort cost since the energy supply is abundant. The renewable energy 
is not available with probability 1 0.2  , in which case the consumer must comply with its 
scheduled power consumption pattern and will incur discomfort cost 
i i
d a( ). 
                                                          
5 This probability comes from the uncertainty of renewable energy generation (whether it is windy in wind energy generation, 
whether it is shiny in solar energy generation, etc.). 
 
                     Fig.3. The Desired Power Consumption Patterns of Type 1, 2, 3 Consumers. 
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Given the same PAR goal, the comparison of total costs using these four algorithms is shown 
in Table VI. We can see that when the number of consumers increases, the N-DSM algorithm 
significantly outperforms other three algorithms. The cost reductions compared to OG-DSM, JO-
DSM and SC-DSM are 40%, 28% and 35% in homogeneous case and 50%, 40% and 47% in 
heterogeneous case, respectively. Note that our algorithm, which is IC, can significantly 
outperform the JO-DSM algorithm, even though it is not IC. 
B. Impact of Discomfort Cost 
Some works [6]-[8][16] consider minimizing the billing cost only, without taking into account 
the discomfort cost; while we consider the problem of jointly minimizing billing and discomfort 
costs as in [9]-[15]. We compare the results of the billing cost minimization algorithm with our 
proposed algorithm in Table VII. In the simulation, we assume that the PAR reduction goal is 
10%. For the billing cost minimization algorithm, since there are numerous optimal solutions 
which achieve the minimal billing cost, we choose a fair solution where all consumers shift the 
same amount of peak-time consumption to off-peak times, and then calculate the billing and 
discomfort costs. By comparing the results in Table VII, we can see that the performance of our 
proposed algorithm significantly outperforms the billing cost minimization algorithm, with 
around 36% cost reduction for the homogeneous scenario and 48% cost reduction for the 
heterogeneous scenario, respectively. In fact, the billing cost minimization algorithm does not 
consider the impact of consumers’ behavior on discomfort costs, resulting in a higher discomfort 
cost than our proposed N-DSM algorithm. The N-DSM algorithm induces the consumers to 
cooperate with each other to reduce their long-term discomfort costs and the consumers with 
higher discomfort costs benefit more through cooperation in the heterogeneous scenario. Thus, the 
performance gain of the N-DSM algorithm over the billing cost minimization policy in the 
heterogeneous scenario is higher than that in the homogeneous scenario. 
TABLE VII.  COMPARISON WITH BILLING COST MINIMIZATION ALGORITHM 
Total Cost/  
Performance  gain 
Number of consumers (Homogeneous) Number of consumers (Heterogeneous) 
30 50 80 100 200 30 50 80 100 200
N-DSM 36.21 60.09 95.52 119.40 238.80 35.21 58.39 92.82 116.10 232.10
Billing cost minimization 56.13 93.55 149.68 187.10 374.20 67.24 112.46 179.77 223.88 448.87
Performance  gain 35% 36% 36% 36% 36% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48%
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C. Impact of Consumer Preferences 
Recall from Section III that in order to achieve the social optimum, i.e., the solution to the 
DDP problem, the system runs the N-DSM algorithm which requires only a subset of the 
consumers to reduce their peak-time power usage. However, some consumers may have certain 
preferences of when to shift their consumption. Hence we simulate the scenario of N m3, 1  , 
to show the impact of consumer preferences. The consumers’ types are Type 1, 2 and 3. We 
compare four cases:  
 Case 1: all consumers can alter their power consumption patterns. 
 Case 2: Type 1 consumer cannot alter its power consumption pattern on Mondays; Type 2 
consumer cannot alter its power consumption pattern on Tuesdays; Type 3 consumer cannot alter 
its power consumption pattern on Wednesdays. 
 Case 3: Type 1 and 3 consumers cannot alter their power consumption patterns on 
Mondays; Type 2 consumer cannot alter its power consumption pattern on Tuesdays. 
 Case 4: Type 1, 2 and 3 consumers cannot alter their power consumption patterns on 
Mondays. 
Note that the four cases represent different levels of heterogeneity in consumer preferences, 
which result in different levels of flexibility in the power consumption scheduling. In Case 1, no 
consumer has specific preferences on how to shift the power consumption pattern. Hence, the 
flexibility of scheduling is the highest. In Case 2, each consumer has distinct preferences on how 
to shift power consumption. Since their preferences are different, the flexibility of scheduling is 
still high. In Case 3, Type 1 and 3 consumers have similar preferences (i.e., both cannot shift on 
                           
Fig.4. Comparison with Different Consumer Preferences. 
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Mondays), which makes the scheduling less flexible (i.e. we can only alter Type 2 consumer’s 
consumption on Mondays). In Case 4, all consumers have the same preference (i.e., all consumers 
cannot shift on Mondays). Hence, the scheduling is the least flexible.  
We can see from Fig. 4 that the average discounted daily cost increases from Case 1 to Case 4, 
as expected. This implies that the system performance depends on the heterogeneity of consumer 
preferences. Regarding the impact of the discount factor on the convergence rate, we can see that 
there is no significant performance loss between the case when 0.90   and the case when 
0.75  . 
D. Impact of Percentage of Shiftable Load 
In order to evaluate the system performance with different percentages of the shiftable load, we 
show the total cost with different PAR reduction goals, as shown in Table VIII. The OG-DSM 
cannot meet the PAR reduction goals, so we compare the other three algorithms. We set the 
number of consumers to be N 100 . Simulation results show that given the constraint imposed 
by the PAR reduction goal, our algorithm can achieve around 8% and 9% reduction in the total 
cost when the percentage of shiftable load varies from 30% to 60%, in the homogeneous and 
heterogeneous scenarios, respectively; while these reductions are 7% and 10% with JO-DSM 
algorithm and 12% and 9% with SC-DSM algorithm. This implies that the performance of our 
algorithm is not significantly affected by consumers being homogeneous or heterogeneous, while 
the performances of the other two algorithms significantly depend on the consumer heterogeneity. 
A trade-off between the optimal total cost and the PAR can be observed: when a higher 
threshold 
th
l (i.e. a smaller m ) is chosen, fewer consumers are required to change their power 
TABLE VIII.  IMPACT OF PERCENTAGE OF SHIFTABLE LOAD 
Total Cost PAR 
Reduction 
goal 
Percentage of shiftable load (Homogeneous) Percentage of shiftable load (Heterogeneous) 
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 
JO-DSM 
10.0% 166.80 155.40 149.30 145.80 143.20 186.80 168.80 159.10 153.60 149.50 
8.0% 160.10 151.00 146.10 143.30 141.20 175.70 161.40 153.80 149.40 146.10 
6.7% 155.60 148.00 144.00 141.60 139.90 168.80 156.80 150.40 146.80 144.00 
SC-DSM 
10.0% -- 161.70 155.40 149.20 142.90 -- 161.60 159.10 154.20 147.80 
8.0% -- 161.70 155.40 149.20 142.90 -- 161.60 159.10 154.20 147.80 
6.7% -- 161.70 155.40 149.20 142.90 -- 161.60 159.10 154.20 147.80 
N-DSM 
10.0% 135.80 124.90 119.10 115.80 113.30 144.80 123.90 115.80 112.40 109.90 
8.0% 128.60 120.00 115.30 112.60 110.60 130.20 116.70 112.00 109.30 107.30 
6.7% 123.80 116.60 112.80 110.50 108.90 120.40 113.30 109.40 107.20 105.50 
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consumption patterns, resulting in a higher PAR but a lower discomfort cost. As a result, this 
trade-off should be considered when choosing the design parameter 
th
l  (or m ). 
E. Impact of the Length of the Peak time 
In this subsection, we evaluate the system performance in terms of the total cost in Table IX, 
when the length of the peak time varies. We set the length of the peak time to be 1 hour 
(H 24 ), 2 hours (H 12 ) and 4 hours (H 6 ). We need to change the desired power 
consumption pattern according to the length of the peak time (for example, the desired power 
consumption level in time slot 1 when H 12  is the sum of the desired power consumption 
levels in time slots 1 and 2 when H 24 ). We fix the PAR reduction goal at 10%. The OG-
DSM cannot meet the PAR reduction goal. We compare the other three algorithms. First, we can 
see that our algorithm achieves a lower total cost than the other two under all lengths of the peak 
time with both homogeneous and heterogeneous consumers. Second, we can observe that the total 
cost rises when the length of the peak time increases. The increase in the total cost comes from the 
increased discomfort cost, because when the length of the peak time increases, the consumers 
need to shift more energy to off-peak times in order to obtain a low peak-time price. Hence, it is 
important to see how the performances of the algorithms vary with the length of the peak time. 
Under our algorithm, there is a slight increase in the total cost, i.e., 3% (homogeneous) and 2% 
(heterogeneous), respectively, when the length of the peak time varies from 1 hour to 4 hours. In 
contrast, the increases in the total cost are significant using the other two algorithms, namely 40% 
(homogeneous) and 38% (heterogeneous) for JO-DSM, and 50% (homogeneous) and 50% 
(heterogeneous) for SC-DSM.  Clearly, our algorithm is less sensitive to the length of the peak 
TABLE IX.  IMPACT OF THE LENGTH OF THE PEAK TIME 
Total Cost Number of consumers (Homogeneous) Number of consumers (Heterogeneous) 
30 50 80 100 200 30 50 80 100 200
JO-DSM 
H=24 44.80 74.66 119.46 149.32 298.65 47.70 79.60 127.30 158.91 318.11
H=12 50.83 84.71 135.54 169.43 338.85 53.68 89.56 143.23 178.83 357.94
H=6 62.89 104.81 167.70 209.63 419.25 65.61 109.44 175.05 218.61 437.50
SC-DSM 
H=24 46.63 77.71 124.34 155.42 310.84 47.73 79.59 127.32 159.07 318.26
H=12 54.47 90.79 145.26 181.58 363.16 55.95 93.31 149.26 186.47 373.08
H=6 70.17 116.95 187.12 233.90 467.80 71.55 119.29 190.84 238.45 477.03
N-DSM 
H=24 36.21 60.09 95.52 119.40 238.80 35.60 59.31 93.78 116.62 234.31
H=12 36.59 60.71 96.48 120.60 241.20 35.59 59.01 93.78 117.30 234.50
H=6 37.36 61.96 98.40 123.00 246.00 36.36 60.26 95.70 119.70 239.30
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time, yielding high performance for different lengths of the peak time as compared to the other 
two algorithms, whose performances degrade a lot when the length of the peak time increases. 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we proposed a nonstationary DSM mechanism, which exploits the repeated 
interactions of the consumers over time. We rigorously prove that the proposed DSM mechanism 
can achieve the social optimum in terms of the total cost, and outperform existing stationary DSM 
strategies. Moreover, the proposed mechanism is IC, meaning that each self-interested consumer 
voluntarily follows the power consumption patterns recommended by the optimal DSM 
mechanism.  Simulation results validate our analytical results on the DSM mechanism design and 
demonstrate up to 50% performance gains compared with existing mechanisms, especially when 
there are a large number of heterogeneous consumers in the systems. In addition, compared to the 
existing mechanisms, the performance of the proposed mechanism is much less sensitive and thus 
much more robust to system parameters such as the consumer heterogeneity and the length of the 
peak time. 
APPENDIX 
A. Proof of Theorem 1 
Given the other consumers’ action  
i
a , we calculate the best response of consumer i . We 
denote 
i h j hj j i
l a
, ,,  
 N .  
(a) If 
i h i h th
l a l
, ,
  , the best response of consumer i  is obviously 
i
a , since 
Lo i i i Lo i
p A d a p A( )  . 
 (b) If 
i h i h th
l a l
, ,
  , then H
i iii
a a a ,   A , we have 
 
H
Lo i Hi Lo i h i i Lo i i h i h i h ih
H
h i h i ih
p A p p a d a p A k a a
p a d a
, , , ,1
,1
( ) ( ) [ (| |) ]
( )  



      
  


 , (12) 
where the first inequality is due to (6). 
Therefore, the unique NE is 
i i
a a*  .□ 
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B. Proof of Theorem 2 
We first prove that N-DSM can achieve the operating points in B . Given any subset I  of m  
consumer, let i I  choose action 
i
a%  and i I t( )  choose action 
i
a . Then i ’s cost is 
i i i I i i I
C I c c†
{ } { }
[ ]
 
 1 1% . It is easy to see that the cost profile † † †( [ ], [ ], , [ ])NC I C I C I1 2 L  is in B . 
Since the other cost profiles in B  are convex combinations of † † †{( [ ], [ ], , [ ])}INC I C I C I1 2 L , all the 
cost profiles in B  can be achieved [24, Lemma 3.7.1]. 
Next, we prove B  to be the Pareto-optimal region by showing that 
N
i i i ii
c c c c m
1
( ( ) ) / ( ),

    % %a a and equality holds only by choosing the action profiles 
described above, which proves the second statement of the theorem. To show these, we analyze 
the solution of the following problem:  
 
N
N
i i i iiC C C
C c c c
1 2
1( , , , )
minimize    ( ) / ( )

 L % %C  (13) 
(a) Suppose 
h Hi
p p( )a , then the optimal action is a  and the corresponding optimal cost 
vector is 
NE NE N NE
C C C
1, 2, ,
( ) ( , , , ) Lc a due to Theorem 1. However, 
 
N N
i NE i i i Hi Lo i h i ii i
N
Hi Lo i h i i Hi Lo h i ii i i
C c c c p p a d a
p p a d a p p l d a m
, ,1 1
,1
( ) / ( ) ( ) / ( )
      ( ) / max{ ( )} ( ) / max{ ( )}
 
  
   
    
 

% % %
% %
N N
. (14) 
where the last inequality is due to (6). 
(b) Suppose 
h Lo
p p( )a  and the optimal action is a . Obviously, N
i h thi
a l
,1
 , otherwise at 
least one consumer can reduce its discomfort cost by shifting peak-time power while keeping the 
total billing cost and other consumers’ discomfort costs unchanged. Next, we show that either 
i h i h
a a
, ,
  or 
i h i h
a b
, ,
 .  
Suppose for  i and j, we have 
i h i h i h
b a a
, , ,
   and 
j h j h j h
b a a
, , ,
  . Without loss of 
generality, we assume 
i h i h i i j h j h j jh h h h
k k d a k k d a
, , , ,
( min ) / ( ) ( min ) / ( )
 
  % % . Then we compare the 
costs of i and j using action a ,  where 
i h i h
a a
, ,
  V , 
i h i h
i h i
a a
a c h h
, ,
,
ˆ ˆ
ˆargmin ( ),
  
  
Va , 
a
A
, 
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j h j h
a a
, ,
  V , 
j h j h
j h j
a a
a c h h
, ,
,
ˆ ˆ
ˆargmin ( ),
  
  
Va , 
a
A
, with 
i h i h j h j h
a b a a
, , , ,
min{ ,  }  V , and 
n n
a a n i j, ,   . Thus, we have: 
j j j ji i i i
i i j j i i j j
i i h i h i h i h i i j j h j h j h j h j jh h h h
i i h i h i h i h i ih h
c c d ac c d a
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   
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.(15) 
We notice that either 
i i
a a  %  or 
j j
a a  , i.e., either 
i i
c c( ) a  or 
j i
c c( )  %a . By repeating 
this procedure, we can finally get a subset I , where i I  chooses action 
i
a% , and i I  chooses 
action 
i
a .  
Therefore, the solution of problem (13) is in the form of 
i
C I†[ ] and the Pareto-optimal region 
can be written as (8). In addition, any other action profile will result in 
N
i i i ii
c c c c m
1
( ( ) ) / ( )

   % %a . In other words, the other cost profiles in the set B  cannot be 
achieved by stationary strategies. □  
C. Proof of Theorem 3 
Based on N-DSM, in time period t , t
i i
c c % , i I t( )  and t
i i
c c ,i I t( ) . Then,  
 t
i i i I t i i I tt
C c c
{ ( )} { ( )}0
(1 ) [ ] 

 
   1 1%  (16) 
where 
{ }
1 g  is the indicator function. We denote Ng g g1 2( , , , ) Lg , 
i i
i
i i
C c
g
c c



%
%
, 
i i
i
i i
C c
g
c c



%
%
and 
i i i i i
g C c c c| ( ) / ),{ }(      % %C Cg CG B . Then we notice that 
t
i i I tt
g
{ ( )}0
(1 ) 


   1  and  CC B  is equivalent to  Cg G .  
We denote by 
i i It
g t
{ ( )}
( ) (1 )   


   1  and i ig g(0)  the continuation cost at time t  
and 0, respectively. Then we use a backward induction method to show that continuation cost at 
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any given time t  can be decomposed of the current cost and the continuation cost at time t 1 . 
We call the vector t( )  Cg G  a feasible vector and through the decomposition we will show that 
when the discount factor   satisfies (11), the continuation cost at any time t 1  is also a feasible 
vector, namely t( 1)  Cg G . Since the original (0)  Cg G , we use mathematical induction to 
show this. 
For time period t , suppose t( )  Cg G , then 
 
i i I t i
g t g t
{ ( )}
( ) (1 ) ( 1) 

   1 . (17) 
Or equivalently, 
 i
i
i
g t i I t
g t
g t i I t
[ ( ) (1 )]/ ,  ( )
( 1)
( ) / ,              ( )
 

      
. (18) 
We need to show N
ii
g t m
1
( 1)

   and i ig t g0 ( 1)   . The former one is obvious due 
to hypothesis. For the latter one, 
i i
g t g0 ( 1)    is obvious for i I t( ) , and for i I t( ) , we 
also need 
 i
i
g t
g i I t
( ) (1 )
0 , ( )


 
   . (19) 
This can be simplified as 
 
i
i
i
g t
i I tg
g t
1 ( )
,  ( )1
1 ( )


     
. (20) 
The first term is satisfied due to hypothesis. The second term requires  
 
C
ig t I t i I t
g t
( ) ( ) ( )
max min max{1 ( )}
  
 
G I
. (21) 
Without loss of generality, we sort 
i
g t( )  in an decreasing order, namely, 
 
m N
g t g t g t g t
1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )    L L  . (22) 
It is easy to calculate: 
 
i I t
i ii I t
g t g t
( )
max{ }( )
max{1 ( )} 1 ( )

   , (23) 
and 
 
i mI t i I t
g t g t
( ) ( )
min max{1 ( )} (1 ( ))
 
  
I
 . (24) 
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Thus, the worst case t( )g  in (21) is 
 
m m
i ii i
m
m g m g
t g g
N m N m
1 1
1 1
1 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( , , , , , )
( 1) ( 1)
 
 

 

   
 L Lg . (25) 
Thus we require 
 
m
ii
m g
N m
1
1
( )
1
( 1)




 
 

 . (26) 
Since m
ii
m g m m
1
1
( ) ( 1)


    , CB  is achievable, when (11) is satisfied. 
D. Proof of Theorem 4 
Obviously, 
N
C C C* * * *
1 2
( ), , LC  is in CB . According to the proof of Theorem 3, 
*C  can be 
decomposed of current cost plus continuation cost: 
 t ti i i i i i i I t i i I t iC c c c g t c c C 1{ ( )} { ( )
* *
}
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )[ ] ( )| |
 
          1 1% % % . (27) 
When the discount factor satisfies (11), the optimal operating point *C  can be achieved by 
decomposing into current cost plus continuation cost in each period. We also notice that the best 
strategy of I t( )  in (21) is to choose I t m( ) {1,2, } L , i.e., the indexed with the m  largest 
i
g t( ) . 
Therefore, the proposed N-DSM can achieve optimal performance *C  in the system.  
To show N-DSM is IC, we need to show that given the operating point 
N C
C C C* * * *
1 2
( ), , LC B  and an arbitrary time period t , the continuation cost is the minimum 
cost achievable for consumer i . By decomposition, we have 
 t ti i i I t i i I t iC c c C 1{ ( ( }
*
{
*
)} )
( ) (1 )[ ] ( )| |
 
      1 1%  . (28) 
Obviously for consumer i I t( ) , it has no incentive to deviate from strategy *  in period t . 
For consumer i I t( ) , if it deviates from strategy * , the minimum cost it can achieve is 
i i
t
i
c a *( , )( ) , since the best response is to choose ia  according to Theorem 1. According to one-
shot deviation principle [24], when consumer i  deviates, the other consumers will play NE 
strategy from time period t 1 . So the cost from period t  is 
 t tti NEi i i i i NEC c a C C1 ,
*| (( ) (1 ) ( , )) |( )
 
         . (29) 
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The second equality holds because ti i i
t
i Ei NE N
c a C C1
*
,
( , ) ( )( ) |

     . Since for 
* , 
t ti i i NE i
C C C C
,max
*
,
( ) min{ , } |( )|
 
   , thus the consumers have no incentive to deviate 
from strategy *  individually. Therefore, N-DSM is IC. □  
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